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In this study, I analyze trade between two growing countries. One of them is 
technologically more advanced (technological leader), while the other is technologically behind 
(technological follower), but owns a significant resource bounty.  The follower uses natural 
resources as an input and sells its output to the advanced country which produces consumption 
goods for both countries. What happens, if these countries integrate by trade. 
In this study, I prove the existence of stable and sustainable growth paths. I examine 
economic growth which is mutually beneficial for both leader and follower. I also explore how 
to generate an economic growth without exhausting a resource bounty of the follower country, 
but how to use trade as a channel for technology diffusion from a technological leader country. 
Ultimately, I examine, what happens if there is an asymmetry in the world market: when 
one country has resources, while other one has better technologies. So, the objective of this 
work is to find out how will these different economies cooperate, trade and integrate with each 
other. 
Deliberations here are accompanied by two models of technological innovation through 
trade and trade with environmental constraints. Calculating these scenarios through, I came to 
conditions under which there is a distinct possibility of gaining a unique steady-state 
equilibrium. These two models persuasively show that there is a way which allows two 
countries grow together but not exhaust their resource bounty at the same time. If two countries 
follow these conditions intently and firmly, then their consumption, output and natural resource 
price grow, while the resource stock hover around the same rate as it used to be. 
I came to an inevitable conclusion: the bigger an economy of technological follower is 
the more it is able to switch from developing its own independent R\& D sector to a technology 
diffusion through trade approach and vice versa. It is also possible to say that the wealth benefits 
more in large country if it has a domestic innovation sector. This ultimately means that in a big 
country a resource bounty is definitely a blessing rather than a curse. Resource richness 
supports investments in R\& D sector in a big open economy. 
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LIST OF SYMBOLS
K(t) — capital stock
RN(t) — resource based input
L — constant labor
h(t) — technological knowledge, efficiency
Y (t) — production (final output)
ρ — rate of time preference
c — consumption
t — observed time period
v(t) — portion of labour devoted to final output production
p — price or cost of commodity
s — resource stock
g(s) — natural resource growth
cc — environmental carrying capacity
q — proportinality parameter
E — extraction effort allocated to the natural resource
θ — elasticity of the resource based input
mK — shadow price of the capital stock
mh — shadow price of technological knowledge
mS — shadow price of the natural resource stock
S — stock of consumer-owned natural resources
g(s) — gross reproduction rate
h — rate of harvesting
g — intrinsic growth rate of each agent’s resource share
k — carrying capacity of each agent’s resource share
v — a share of representative consumer’s labor
wB — wage rate
B — per capita consumption rate
aA — per-capita asset
r — asset-return rate
wA — wage rate
cA — per-capita consumption of domestic good
cAB — per-capita consumption of good imported from country B
pB — price of country B’s goods
11 Introduction
There is a fine line between effectively developing system and one that
wastes its opportunities. Impetuous process of economic growth worldwide per-
suasively demonstrates that growth and development means moving forward and
making hard, precise and sophisticated decisions. Sustainable growth is linked
to an effective growth model that each country adheres to. The role of growth
and trade in a worldwide economy can hardly be underestimated, as up to date
these terms have become all-pervading for economic life of countries, as well as
growth and trade determine quite a lot of aspects of society’s life and functioning
of states in general.
The development of a market economy requires a corresponding trade model,
which allows carrying out calculations in the national economy in accordance
with generally accepted international standards. In this regard, the reliability,
mutual growth, as well as ecological matters step forth to the front of the stage.
Trade between different economies with different properties, which is in con-
tact with all aspects of the economic activity of the state, is today a strategically
important channel, making possible a clear and qualitative mutually beneficial
economic growth which also cares about resource abundance, ecology and other
important matters.
In connection with the development of scientific and technological progress
in recent years, trade and resource extraction systems have undergone significant
changes. But even today, the effectiveness of the functioning of bilateral trade
between, say, technologically advanced countries and technologically backward
countries (though rich with resources) is determined by the correct formulation
of system tasks, its technical support and technological excellence, application
of new instruments, which is particularly important in the framework of the pro-
cesses of globalization of trade system.
In connection with the development of scientific and technological progress
in recent years, trade and resource extraction systems have undergone significant
2changes. But even today, the effectiveness of the functioning of bilateral trade
between, say, technologically advanced countries and technologically backward
countries (though rich with resources) is determined by the correct formulation
of system tasks, its technical support and technological excellence, application
of new instruments, which is particularly important in the framework of the pro-
cesses of globalization of trade system.
There is a substantial amount of empirical works that illustrate a negative
correlation between resource richness and economic development. At the same
time, there are some positive examples of economic performance shaped by re-
source abundance. Even though a huge part of empirical evidence shows that
country has a little chance of making a good economic record, there actually
are some countries which economic success was formidable. There are nations
which used their rich pool of natural resources from which they could draw their
wealth and sustainable growth. One would do well to remember the fact that
such countries like Australia, Canada, Iceland, United States, New Zealand and
Scandinavian countries lured their positive economic record exactly by their re-
source abundance. One of the models used in this work proves us that despite
failure of some countries to use their natural resources wisely, they may still
prove useful and effective if correctly managed. Fateful as it sounds, some gov-
ernments have recently despoiled their lands and incurred wrath of their own
people for incompetence and irresponsibility. However, most of economists be-
lieve that those countries are still capable of gaining a sustainable growth. If one
spills its wisdom over their resource richness, then corruption, policy failures,
ineffective investments and other causes of poor economic performance could
not be lured to resource bounty, and once they‘ve tasted economic success, they
will be unstoppable.
One of my main interests in this thesis is to answer the question: how two
countries can integrate and gain economic prosperity through international trade.
Governments of both developing and developed countries should come to under-
standing of how to modify their trade and production policies in order to reach
maximum benefit from their collaboration. This thesis deals with the following
issues related to the bilateral trade between two states:
31) Differences in country profiles (characteristics): two types of economies are
taken into account; one of them is a technological leader which lacks resources,
and other is a technological follower which is however endowed with a substan-
tial resource bounty;
2) Asymmetry between two trading economies;
3) Environmental constraints, conditions under which a technological follower’s
resources would not be exhausted;
4) Technological diffusion through trade as a tool which may ensure technologi-
cal follower’s further development.
Trade between technological leaders and followers has increased very rapidly
after the Cold War era. As we may evidence, Asia, South America and Africa
(where the majority of developing countries are concentrated) trade with North-
Atlantic countries. For instance, in 2015 the trade turnover (in goods only) be-
tween European Union and Russia has reached a level of more than 210 bn EUR
(in 2014 it was more than 285 bn EUR). Figure 1 below illustrates how Russia
rapidly increments its trade turnover with EU (even though last two years were
not that successful in that sense, but the diagram shows rather cyclic nature of
goods flow between two economies).
Traditionally Russia was (and in many senses still is) a technological fol-
lower country, population of which had relatively low purchasing capacity. How-
ever in past twenty years this gap between Russia and EU countries has started to
shrink (once again, last two years have a negative trend but it is caused mainly by
political circumstances paired with lowering oil prices). Russian and EU have
traded a lot in recent years (Russia was exporting mainly its resources while
EU was trading by more sophisticated goods). Both parts were definitely ben-
efiting from this collaboration. At the same time Russia was able to invest in
its Research and Development sector which is still not as efficient as in EU
but has reached a substantial level which may help (in future) to reduce Rus-
sias resource-prices dependence. To sum up, bilateral trade between these two
economies augment potential of both parts (Russia and EU) and has proven its
beneficial nature.
4Figure 1: Total goods: EU trade flows and balance, annual data 2005-2015
(Source: Eurostat)
Growing economies of developed countries shows just how complex and
multifaceted national economies have become. And this is reflected in the ap-
pearance of the special requirements for participants of international trade to the
conditions of environment and nature. Building a reliable modern trade systems
will certainly promote the development of domestic financial markets, which,
in turn, can be considered as one of the main keys to successful development
of the state. Achieving that is possible only if trading partners consider inter-
ests of each other and recognize their responsibilities over environment. At the
same time we must not forget about rapidly growing integration processes in the
global economy. The desire to unite the trade markets, the transition to uniform
standards of money and cash flow management necessitates the aligned effective
trade model, which is minimally painful and can most efficiently implement such
processes. Construction and development of international trade models should
be viewed in conjunction with both the environmental and resource conditions,
and the property rights system.
51.1 Research questions
This work tries to deal with several different questions related to integration
and economic cooperation between two countries. In principle, there are a cou-
ple of research topics closely connected with each other:
1) How is it possible to reach a stable and sustainable economic growth through
economic integration?
2) How can both technologically leading and following countries maximize their
utility from this collaboration without exhausting their resources?
Practice shows that the answers for these two question vary depending on
one’s perspective. My ambition is to find an optimal path which is the most ra-
tional and beneficial for both parts. Governments of developing (but resource
rich) countries all over the world struggle to find the way to maximize the use of
a resource bounty they have and try to deliberate how to spend it wisely. Devel-
oping countries try to catch up with those of developed kind for a whole range
of reasons. Doing so without exhausting their natural heritage and ensuring pos-
sibility of technological catch up with technological leaders are cornerstones of
this research.
The object of study of the thesis is the trade system, as an instrument for techno-
logical diffusion and macroeconomic growth.
The subjects of the study are the economic, organizational and technical
matters arising in the course of formation and functioning of the trade model.
1.2 The structure of the thesis
This thesis comprises of several chapters.
The first one has completely introductory nature and is designed to clearly state
the purpose of this whole thesis work.
In Chapter 2 I do a literature review which shows how widely this topic is
discussed in scientific circles. I discuss the literature on the growth and integra-
tion between countries which fuels and lights up each states growth. This should
6be considered as a preface for the models I go through in later chapters.
In Chapter 3 I introduce an approach on mentioned above issues based on
the study from the Cabo et al. (2014) which in its turn is to some extent is based
on Eliasson and Turnovsky (2004). This chapter is trying to tackle issues of tech-
nological diffusion through trade and supports the main theoretical model in the
next chapter.
Next up, I develop Chapter 4, which uses a very popular concept of North-
South relationships. The Chapter kickstarts from the North-South trade and the
sustainability of economic growth: a model with environmental constraints by
the same authors as in previous Chapter in 2005. This Chapter deals with a
highly important issue environmentally friendly economic growth.
2 Research and literature review
Significance of trade between different countries for a modern economy
and each particular state is unquestionable. However, it should be noted that in
the publications economists covers only certain aspects of trade and following
processes. However, the topic of trade which takes into account resource ex-
haustion, deals with asymmetry, brings technological diffusion and at the same
time enhances mutual growth is getting increasingly popular and catches a lot of
attention.
There is a whole variety of growth-related models in the history of macroe-
conomic growth researches. Back in 1946 Harrod-Domar model introduced a
groundbreaking term of productivity growth which was used deliberately by
many other economists later in history. Then in 1956 Solow and Swan managed
to develop their own basic growth models, which were related to a long-run eco-
nomic growth. Captial accumulation, population growth, technological progress
(reflected in studies as productivity growth) were major factors employed in their
models. Their models were received a major recognition and were used lately
as a starting point for some other models which were based on augmentation of
7what Robert Solow and Trevor Swan has created (independently).
It is a commonly known fact that the most contemporary literature empha-
sizes and point societys attention to the fact that natural resources of both devel-
oped and developing countries are excessively overused.
However, objective trends of current economic reality bring to our attention
the fact that in many developed countries (which are often very rich with natural
resources, be it gas, forests, oil, precious metals, gold mines or even drinking wa-
ter) are in hands of international corporations, Not only do these corporate giants
exhaust resource stocks of hosting countries, but all profits from their activities
go abroad and do not contribute to the wealth of developing countries. Some
researches (Contreras 1987) persuasively show that forest industry in many de-
veloping countries are occupied by transnational companies. Indeed, some poor
countries have to use a concession deals in order to attract any investment to their
countries (Bourke 1999).
All these facts described in literature are important not only because they shrink
economic opportunities but also because they threaten environmental wellbeing
of any particular country. That is why environmental constraints have become so
popular lately.
For example, some authors embed environmental variables within their
models just to figure out economic policies that guarantee a stable growth (Gradus
and Smulders, 1993; Huang and Cai, 1994; Ligthart and van del Ploeg, 1994;
Verdier, 1995; Bovenberg and Smulders, 1996; Musu, 1996; Bovenberg and
Mooji, 1997). At the same time it is worth of mentioning that all of models con-
centrate on specific countries but ignore trade ties with other countries. It appears
that the most of articles (related to endogenous growth paired with environmen-
tal concerns) published in journals do not take into account a very existence of
other regions than the one they observe. Hettich (2000) though considered a
compilation of countries in his model but they all were homogenized.
Considering the framework of two different regions trading between each
8other and following the static approach laid down, for example by Chichilin-
sky (1994); Panayotou (1994); Copeland and Taylor (1995), and Cabo (1999),
it is assumed here that one of the region‘s specialization is closely related to
resource-intensive goods intermediate goods which, in turn, are used as an input
for a final good which is produced in some other distant region.
It has become a common point of view recently that environment-friendly
know-hows and technologies should be applied vastly in order to maintain a con-
temporary quality of life on one hand, and without damaging surrounding envi-
ronment on the other one. Romer (1990) embeds Research and Development in
his growth model; Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992)
and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) are often considered as an iconic master-
pieces describing this phenomenon.
The methodology in most previous papers on the topic, most importantly on
environment and economics growth, Bovenberg and Smulders (1996), and Musu
(1996) do pay a lot of attention to this topic.
Dramatic changes in the world economy and in all developed and devel-
oping countries demonstrate that modern world is facing new challenges in the
area of economic growth and in terms of trading progress. Consequently, the
development of national economies is moving towards sophistication of its de-
signs, which, in turn, is reflected in brand new, previously unknown growth and
integration models.
Based on the above issues, it is possible to confidently assert the relevance
of the chosen topic. Regulation of growth and trade between technologically
advanced countries which is though has insufficient amount of natural resources
on one hand and another country which is endowed with a resource bounty (but
at the same time is technologically backward) on the other hand, allow promptly
eliminate the causes that could affect badly the nature and flow of the interna-
tional wealth. Thus, the issues of bilateral growth and trade (which are particu-
larly relevant today), as well as the importance of the catching-up development,
providing it as a vital element of modern economic architecture, predetermine
9the formulation of the goals and objectives of the work.
The modern world economy can be characterized by a variety of forms and
methods of cross border trade, vast scale integration of all countries into the
international community, intensive trade and economic cooperation and coop-
erative relationships. All these features of cooperation between countries aim
to improve economic development and economic growth of participating coun-
tries. In this regard, current research are more or less related to interdependence
of economic growth and the country’s international trade.
In general, most economists agree with the view that trade cooperation
between countries with different economic profile is a cornerstone of modern
world‘s development as one of the most fundamental provisions of the economic
theory. However, there yet is a number of hypotheses, which are not imple-
mented in international trade theory. For instance, the Leontief paradox, the
Rubczinski effect are still not fully understood. John. D. Frankel and Romer
(1999) cite examples where modeling international trade textbooks are not able
to describe its structure and model of the modern world economy.
Developing and transitive economies are still using the traditional relative
advantages, such as the difference in resource abundance between countries, the
monopoly on natural and geographical resources. In developed economies, the
driving forces of foreign trade are the factors resulting from innovation pro-
cesses, leadership in the implementation of informational and communication
technologies, consumer preferences. In these circumstances, it should be noted
the backlog of foreign trade research in the context of economic growth.
Theoretical studies of foreign trade as a growth factor historically involved
representatives of a number of schools of economic thought. Their works present
theories and assumptions made by the mercantilists, physiocrats, classical and
neoclassical on the board, as well as leftist criticism related to the ”third world”
countries. Not only do local producers reduce their misallocations when forced
to be a part of a greater (international) but also they increase their aggregate pro-
ductivity.
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However, there are different point of views on that subject. For instance,
Edmond and Midrigan (2015) have already proven that trade between countries
with different profile can significantly reduce markup distortions if two condi-
tions are satisfied:
(i) there is extensive misallocation, and
(ii) international trade does in fact put producers under greater competitive
pressure. However, following their work, it seems that if countries with way too
vast differences make attempts to trade with each other, it may lead to a situation
in which producers from one of trading countries take advantage of the moment
and gain additional market share in other country, which consequently means
that it will increase so called markups and their dispersion in a way which may
expose competitive gains from trade in a negative way.
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3 The basic model
3.1 Domestic innovation as a driver of sustainable growth
Now I am going to use a model developed by Francisco Cabo, Guiomar
Martin-Herran and Maria Pilar Martinez-Garcia in 2014.The authors of the model
admit that it [their model] is based on Eliasson and Turnovsky work (2004),
but unlike their counterparts they come to different conclusion. I am going to
start this section with taking an intent look at a situation in which there is some
relatively small but closed economy which is, at the same time, blessed with
a sufficient resource stock. The production cycle begins with local population
harvesting resources in their country and contributing these raw materials as an
input, which is used for the manufacturing of final goods. This, together with
labour force and a portion of non-durable goods is used to make final products
of this country.
Here arises an important issue of property rights for natural resources. There
are several approaches on who and how should distribute property rights on nat-
ural resources and whether it is effective to spread such kind of rights on entire
population or not. Birdyshaw and Ellis (2007) show in their work that based on
individual person’s desire to reduce external costs, property rights might be able
to develop and exist independently from some external influence or authority.
That is why it is possible to proceed here with the net growth rate of each
agent’s resource share, which is going to be reflected here as a difference be-
tween natural reproduction and the harvesting:
s˙ = g(s)− h = gs
(
1− s
k
)
− h. (1)
The notion of g(s) stands for resource’s gross reproduction rate of the logistic
(Clark 1990) So, here the net growth is equal to natural reproduction g(s) minus
the harvesting h. S stock of the consumer-owned natural resources; g(s) gross
reproduction rate; h rate of harvest; g and k intrinsic growth rate and carrying
capacity of each agent’s resource share.
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It is also worth of mentioning that a representative consumer has at its dis-
posal some fraction of labor which it is able to use. As a default case, we will
consider a situation in which a typical worker / consumer has to divide his frac-
tion of labor on two parts:
1. One part, v, is deliberately used for a final output production sector,
and our typical consumer spends it on the actual manufacturing process, and
v ∈ [0, 1];
2. What is left, 1 − v, is spent completely on the harvesting of natural re-
sources activities.
Now time has come to introduce a harvest function itself, which is deter-
mined by (i) labor allocated in the economy which actually harvests resources,
and (ii) the stock of resources itself which is a subject of harvesting by local
inhabitants:
h(v, s) = b(1− v)1−δsθ, and b < 0, 0 < δ < 1, 0 ≤ s ≤ κ, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. (2)
θ here stands as a parameter which indicates dependency of harvesting on the
amount of resources available. This hugely depends on accessibility of resources
(whether it can be harvested by just taking it from the tree tree, or one should
make a significant effort to extract a portion of resource bounty). Here, for in-
stance θ = 0 if there is no correlation between the largeness of the resource stock
and harvesting; when θ = 1 as harvesting covariates perfectly with the resource
stock size.
In this particular setup, a typical harvester trades resources he or she harvested
(at a price ph) to an entity (or entities) which manufacture final goods. So, ulti-
mately a harvesters benefit depends largely on income derived from the usage of
resources he or she harvested. This is paired with wage, w, which together with
selling cost ph contributes to his or her financial assets. Consequently, let’s move
on and take a look at the per-capita budget constraint for a typical consumer:
a˙ = ra+ vw + phh− c, a(0) = a0. (3)
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where a stands for the per-capita assets; r refers to the rate of return on assets (we
assume that a representative consumer receives some financial interest on what
he or she has accumulated);c is for the per-capita consumption of final good; a0
refers to the initial amount of per-capita assets.
So, it all boils down to a situation in which our consumer of this country has
to deliberate what level of consumption, c is optimal for him or her, and how
much of his or her time and effort he / she is willing to spend on the final-output
production or in harvesting. As a consequence, a representative consumer has to
face a dilemma on how to maximize his discounted utility:
max
c,v
∫ ∞
0
ln(c)eρtdt, rho > 0, (4)
s.t. s˙ = g(s)− h = gs (1− s
k
)− h
a˙ = ra+ vw + phh− c.
Hereby, it is worth of of mentioning that a perfect property rights are assumed,
as each and every consumer of the final goods takes full responsibility and suffer
financial losses for every his / her actions. Cabo et al. (2014) assume that this is
the way which ensures maximum efficiency of resource usage.
As for the final output sector, it is important to consider that according to this
setup it consists of a large amount of small entities. An output production of
such kind of entity may be described this way:
Y = A(vL)1−α−β
N∑
j=1
Xαj (hL)
β, A > 0, 0 < α, β, α + β < 1, (5)
here N stands for the number of intermediate good varieties; while Xj refers to
the quantity of the jth kind of intermediate good, j ∈ {1, ..., N}.
Having this said,now it is possible to proceed to a typical firm which also has its
own maximization problem. A representative firm works so that its productivity
vain as as cost of input goes up (this means that the productivity of a typical
firm depends also on such variables as vL,Xj, h
←−
L . Consequently, here is the
maximization a maximization problem of a typical firm:
max
v,h,Xj ,j=1,...,N
A(vL)1−α−β
N∑
j=1
Xαj (hL)
β − w(vL−
N∑
j=1
pjXj − phhL, (6)
14
where pj stands for the price of intermediate good j.
Now let’s turn our attention to the essence of what makes this economy grow:
technological progress. It is assumed that this sector has unstable amount of
operating entities (firms). Besides, technological progress here is working so
that it just lets a representative firm expand an amount of variety of intermediate
goods it can work with. However, technological progress has no influence on
resource harvesting sector.
The sector works so that a newly invented good of type j costs σ units of Y to
produce. More than that, each entity in the sector monopolizes the manufacture
of a particular intermediate good. Obviously, new monopolist of a particular
good is able to dictate its own price pj , in order to reach its goal of maximizing
profits, which can be described by the following equation:
pi = (pj − σ)Xj.
Everything described above allows to come to the present value of the profits for
a single intermediate good, which is:
ησ =
∫ ∞
t
pije
−r(z,t)(z−t)dz, (7)
where r(z, t) = [1/(z − t)] ∫ z
t
r(u)du refers to the average interest rate between
times z and t.
3.2 Steady-state equilibrium: intrinsic innovation
Here we oppose an open-access resource regime all others. An economy of
the country suffers greatly (environment-wise) if harvesters do their job in rates
which are lower than at open-access regime. Therefore, a proposition is needed
to to clarify given conditions:
Proposition 1. If the natural resource is an open-access resource, the repre-
sentative consumer would allocate a fraction of labor voa = 1/φ, to output
production (and correspondingly, 1− 1/φ, to harvesting), where
φ =
1− α− δβ
1− α− β > 1. (8)
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A standard Euler equation is needed in order to maximize consumers’ util-
ity. It shall reflect increment of pre-capita consumption:
c˙
c
= r − ρ. (9)
At the same time, firms also have a tendency to maximize their profits, which is
normally done by making factor prices even:
w = (1− α− β) Y
vL
, ph = β
Y
hL
, Xj =
(
αA
pj
) 1
1−α
Lv
1−α−β
1−α h
β
1−α . (10)
Let’s consider XJ from (10) as a demand function for an intermediate good
j. The entity that manufactures it , maximizes its profits at price level of pj .
Consequently:
Xj = X =
(
A
σ
) 1
1−α
α
2
2−αLv
1−α−β
1−α h
β
1−α . (11)
Let’s differentiate (7) with respect to t:
r =
1
η
1− α
α
X =
1
η
1− α
α
(
A
σ
) 1
1−α
α
2
2−αLv
1−α−β
1−α h
β
1−α . (12)
At this stage it is highly important that we consider only an country which has
a closed economy and, as a consequence, it is closed to international financial
influx. Thus, the dynamics in the number of intermediate goods is going to look
this way:
N˙ =
1
η
[
Y − cL
σ
−NX
]
, N(0) = N0. (13)
Proposition 2. If a steady-state equilibrium exists, along this path:
• s, v, h and r remain constant;
• Y, c, ph and w, all grow at the same rate as N .
In fact, a steady-state equilibrium, to a very high extent, embodies a sus-
tainable growth path. The economy of a country may develop and grow in stable
and firm way if it is given conditions described above. This, however is possible
16
only if such variables as v, s and c = c/N are kept at a constant rate. Now a
Lemma is needed to describe the dynamics of these variables:
Lemma 1. Any steady-state equilibrium for the model previously described cor-
responds to a steady state of the following three differential equations:
c˙ = c
{
L
η
[
c
σ
−
(
1− α
α
)
α
1+α
1−α
(
A
σ
) 1
1−α
v
1−α−β
1−α h
β
1−α
]
− ρ
}
, (14)
v˙ = Ω(v)
{
Θ(v, s) + (φv − 1) c˙
c
}
, (15)
s˙ = g(s)− h(v, s), (16)
where
Ω(v) =
(1− α)v(1− v)
(1− α)(1− v) + (1− α− β)(1− δv)(φv − 1) ,
Θ(v, s) =
[
ρ− g
(
1− 2s
κ
)
+ θ
1− α− β
1− α
s˙
s
]
(φv − 1)− θ(1− v)h
s
.
This proposition is a quintessence of what is needed to ensure the existence of a
unique steady state.
Proposition 3. The existence and uniqueness of a steady-state equilibrium with
c∗ > 0, 1/φ < v∗ < 1 and 0 < s∗ < κ have been proven:
• for θ = 1, under sufficient condition g ≥ ρ;
• for θ = 0, under necessary and sufficient condition g ∈ (ρ, g+), where
g+ =
hoa
κ/2
+
√(
hoa
κ/2
)2
+ ρ2,
and hoa is the harvesting rate under an open-access regime.
In case when θ = 0, variables s∗ and v∗ can be calculated in a following
way:
g+ =
g − ρ
2g
κ <
κ
2
, v∗ = 1−
{
(g2 − ρ2)κ
4gb
} 1
1−δ
. (17)
17
Consequently, what is needed for a positive s∗ is g > ρ, which also ensures v∗
being less then 1. However, when θ = 1, an isolated version for the resource
deposit and v at the final output sector can not be derived at the steady state. On
the other hand, having g > ρ,guarantees presence of a unique equilibrium , given
h∗ ≤ hoa.
Proposition 4. The steady-state equilibrium is a saddle point with a one-dimensional
stable manifold.
Next up,let’s employ a proposition which will tackle consequences which
nature has to suffer because of steady state equilibrium it has acquired.
Proposition 5. When a unique steady-state equilibrium exists, the stock of the
resource, s∗, increases while the labor share in the final output sector, v∗, de-
creases, with the intrinsic growth rate of the resource, g. Likewise, s∗ increases
with the carrying capacity, κ, while its effect on v∗ is negative for θ = 0 but is
null for θ = 1.
Now, we can derive a consumption growth rate along the steady-state equi-
librium using per-capita consumption and (12):
γ =
1
η
1− α
α
X − ρ = 1
η
1− α
α
(
A
σ
) 1
1−α
α
2
2−αLv
1−α−β
1−α h
β
1−α − ρ. (18)
Obviously, as gross reproduction of natural resource stock goes up, citizens of
the country tend to spend more time on resource harvesting activities. The higher
is κ, the better s∗ feels itself. Consequently, an increase in carrying capacity of
the natural resources, increments h the same way as it does with the equilibrium
resource stock.
Proposition 6. The long-term growth rate of the economy, γ, decreases with η,
and increases with κ and g.
This proposition reflects consequences of the long-lasting growth rate of
economy on differences in the expenses related to innovation. Obviously, the
higher goes η, the lower is r. This, in turn, shrinks the growth rate of economy.
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The model described above is designed so that resource harvesting is fuelling
the final production sector. Consequently, low level of equilibrium level of the
portion of the labor employed in resource harvesting paired with high levels of
carrying capacity of each agent’s resource share has its own indirect effect on
economy’s growth rate. So, the more people we have in resource harvesting sec-
tor, the higher harvesting rate is, the bigger (in size) is the final output-production
sector, which, consequently, speeds up the economic growth. However, it is im-
portant here to realize that these effects (h and v) have opposite signs; and here
is the place when we have to compare an open-access regime (for resources) and
a perfect property rights approach.In first case (open-access regime), citizens of
the country will prefer to choose voa = 1/φ, and this will lead to a situation in
which h and v overlap each other. On the other hand we have a perfect prop-
erty rights approach for which people are tend to choose lesser portion of their
time for the harvesting activities: h(v∗, s∗) < hoa, which inevitably leads us to
v∗ > voa. For the final output production sector it means that a bigger share of v
is going to be concentrated in it.
It is also worth of mentioning that since we figured out that a higher η influ-
ences negatively r, a typical consumer of the country makes a firm decision to
increment his / her consumption considering at the same time investment. This
increments a c∗.
But what if a resource stock which the country has at its disposal is even
higher than we considered initially? A richer resource bounty imposes a multiple
effects on economic life of the state. First and foremost, it will increment har-
vesting, which in turn, will transform into a bigger income flow for harvesters,
which will also transmit into a higher consumption per variety of good.
At the same time, the more resources a state has, the less stricter environ-
mental constraints become. This leads to a higher portion of labor force involved
in harvesting activities. Altogether, this, once again, lets us to come to conclu-
sion that resource abundance is not a curse for a country, but it has a platform for
a faster pace of economic growth.
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3.3 Sustainable growth with technological diffusion through
trade
Original idea uses following framework: relatively small but open economy
uses its resource bounty to purchase goods from abroad and eventually gains
a sustainable growth which is not correlated with resource extraction; authors
discovered that in long run such kind of growth model loses its power. As it
wanes, so too does its ability to maintain in good conditions main growth indi-
cators, such as growth rate. Even though authors do acknowledge that resource
abundance may bolster economic performance in general and carries powerful
effects, but countries own powers will fade in time. It is inevitable, Eliasson and
Turnovsky claim. Francisco Cabo, Guiomar Martin-Herran and Maria Martinez-
Garcia sought to overthrow this effect, and used this model as a foundation of
their own. At the same time, our authors wanted to cast aside the original con-
clusion. Cabo et al. have decided that Eliasson and Turnovsky should relinquish
their positions on this question mainly because their conclusions were shack-
led only to labor factor (a considerable amount of the labor force is allocated
in the resource extraction sector which steals needed fraction of labor from the
final output sector, which results into diminishing growth in long term) and com-
pletely ignored other explanatory variables (rent-seeking, trade terms, political
incentives etc.).
Countries with developing economies are prone to depend on overseas in-
novations much more than on blighty ones when it comes to searching for a
headspring of technological improvements. Growth of country which is just a
developing one but yet blessed with huge resource deposits and one which is
not independent from outland resource supplies can theoretically be held based
on its investment in domestic research and development sector. However, these
countries can also depend on bilateral trade as a channel for technology diffusion
from technologically advanced country. Based on this, we can try to illustrate a
model of a trade between two countries (or two different types of economies):
one of them is technologically advanced and can be seen as a source of technical
development (lets call those countries A), while another is technologically back-
wards and is willing to import some available innovations (B countries). Lets
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suggest that there are some final goods producers in country B that are willing
to acquire new intermediate inputs that belong to country A. Here we will show
how exactly countries blessed with huge amounts of natural resources can ben-
efit from positive trade relationships with technologically advanced countries in
order to gain a sustainable and steady economic growth which in turn leads to
saving resources of both economies.
Quite a lot of developing countries are bonded to the extraction of resources,
which can be sold to foreign counterpart or wisely used in domestic production
process. The most important problem that those economies face is related to
the gaining a timeless economic development (growth) with limited amount of
natural resources they have. This limited silhouette of natural resources in some
particular country is tied to the fact that even despite the recognition of renewa-
bility of the resources, possibility to extract it is limited. The dispute on the real
effects of resource abundance on the growth rate is staggering and closely tied to
its sustainability.
Of course this model cannot channel nowadays world in its entire com-
plexity, so let’s assume some simplifications: we consider a situation in which
there’re just these two countries (A and B), such that A is the one economy
that has enough capacity to export its technology (innovation), and B is the one
available consumer of those technologies as well as the only supplier of natural
resources on the market.
A typical consumer in country B is responsible for the flows of natural re-
sources and his net growth rate (amount of increase that a variable has gained
within a specific period) and context is represented as following:
s˙ = g(s)− h = gs
(
1− s
k
)
− h. (19)
This implies that property right for resources are equally spread over a numerous
little entities all over the country of origin, so that none of them is too large to
make its own rules on average market pricing. In other words, they are all price
takers. Each entity owns as its property a little portion of common stock s0.
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We also can denote a per-capita harvest rate:
h(v, s) = b(1− v)1−δeθ. (20)
v a share of representative consumer‘s labor; As we have agreed, a typical con-
sumer of country B does not execute any innovative actions, which means that
he/she has a specific budget constraint:
vwB + phh = cB (21)
wB wage rate;
cB per capita consumption rate.
It appears that one and the only kind of deposit (asset) that typical consumer
in country B can have is his own natural resources. Consequently, he or she has
to define for him- or herself a size of cF and the share of v and contribute it either
to harvesting or to final output in order to maximize utility:
∫ ∞
0
ln(cB)e
−ρtdt. (22)
Since the final output consists of a numerous entities which are actually
producing some sort of goods we can come down with final output production
function:
YB = AB(vLB)
1−α−β
N∑
j=1
XαB(hLB)
β. (23)
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Citizens of innovative country may enjoy consumption of both domestic fi-
nal output and a final good which is imported from technological follower coun-
try. On the other hand, citizens of country B are able to compile assets which can
exist in form of property rights on innovative firms, which in their turn can bring
some profits in form of interest rent. Consequently, per-capita budget constraint
for the people of country B is:
aA = raA + wA − cA − pBcAB. (24)
aA per-capita asset;
r asset-return rate;
wA wage rate;
cA per-capita consumption of domestic good;
cAB per-capita consumption of good imported from country B;
pB price of country B‘s goods.
As a consequence, a representative consumer has to decide between cA and
cAB in order to maximize utility:∫ infty
0
[ln(cA) + ln(cAB]e
−ρtdt. (25)
Which is a subject for a budget constraint above.
Let‘s assume that the selling price of the domestic final good is pA = 1. As a
result, we have pB representing not just country B‘s price of goods, but also its
real exchange rate. Thus, production of a final output in country A can be illus-
trated as follows:
YA = AAL
1−α
A
N∑
j=1
XαAj. (26)
So, as we know, manufacturing of intermediate good is executed in the
country which is an innovator. However, it is worth of mentioning that this is
true only if protection of such institute as intellectual property rights is of a very
high level in both countries. As soon as an intermediate good is invented, it has
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some cost of σA units of YA to produce, on the other hand the one who produces
these type of goods earns pj of YA. It happens so that the monopolist deter-
mines the price in order to maximize his immediate profits in A and B, given
by pi = (pj − 1)(XAj + XBj), where both X are the functions of demand on
intermediate good of type j in both countries A and B.
Expenses related to assembly of a new intermediate is assumed to be η times
higher than actually manufacturing it. Nonetheless, the one who invents has to
consider expenses above its normal research and development investments ex-
penditure, as it is required to accustom and transmit product for consumption in
the country which is a technological follower. This kind of expense is ν (such
that ν < η). This is the case mainly because it is rational to presume that the
innovator is much more prepared to accustom his goods for a foreign market.
More than that, it is also plausible to presume that is small enough to convince
innovator that this kind of adjustment can bring a sufficiently big recoupment.
As we may deliberate, a free-entry assumption equates the present value of the
profits for each intermediate ν + η,
ν + η =
∫ infty
t
pije
−r(z,t)(z−t)dz. (27)
3.4 Steady-state equilibrium: technological diffusion through
trade
Solving the profit-maximization problem of firms for a technological fol-
lower country, it all boils down to net marginal products which are equated to
factor prices:
wB = (1− α− β) YB
vLB
(28),
XBj = vLB
(
αAB
pBj
) 1
1−α
(
h
v
) β
1−α
, (29)
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ph = β
YF
hLF
.(30)
At the same time, a firm which makes a final-output in a technological
leader country solves its profit-maximization problem this way:
wA = (1− α)YA
LA
(31),
XAj = LA
(
αAA
pAj
) 1
1−α
.(32)
Now let‘s return to a representative consumer‘s utility maximization prob-
lem: it requires one very important condition:
cA = pBcAB
as well as these consumption growth rates:
c˙A
cA
= r − ρ, (33)
c˙AB
cAB
= r − ρ− p˙B
pB
. (34)
The next step is of high importance, as we take into consideration demand
functions for intermediate good of type j in both countries. Firms that manu-
facture it, has to solve a special profit-maximization problem in order to yield
pj = 1/ > 1. Thus, the number of each intermediate in each A and B is:
XAj = XA = LAA
1
1−α
A α
2
1−α , (35)
XBj = XB = LB(pBAB)
1
1−αα
2
1−αν
1−α−β
1−α h
β
1−α . (36)
Consequently, now we may obtain the rate of return on innovation and for-
eign investment (the cost for innovation country to accustom its goods for the
conditions of technological follower):
r =
1
η + ν
1− α
α
(XA +XB). (37)
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It happens so that investment returns in country A are in a close connection with
the monopolistic benefits of discussed intermediate goods sector. Let‘s recall that
we only consider an economy which is closed to international asset exchange,
thus the trend of number of intermediate goods can be described this way:
N˙ =
1
η + ν
[
YA − (cA + pBcAB)LA −N
(
XA − 1− α
α
XB
)]
. (38)
The main thing is that constant increase of this N leads to a consequent
production growth in the final-output sector. What is even more important, this
statement is true for both countries A and B. More than that, this holds without
diminishing of the natural resource bounty.
To sum up, here we face a problems that have to be solved in both A and
B countries. Country A has such kind of problem: a typical consumer chooses
ca or cAB in order to maximize his utility function. His salary wA and and rate
of return r are given above. At the same time, country B a typical consumer has
to choose his ν to maximize his own utility. The wage rate wB and the resource
price ph are also discussed above.
Now let‘s focus on steady state equilibria. The model is compiled with several
propositions and one lemma, which describe a steady-state equilibrium:
Proposition 7. If a steady-state equilibrium exists, along this path
• v, s, h, pB and r remain constant;
• YA, YB, cA, cAB, cB, ph, wA, and wB grow at the same rate as N .
It is visible that the steady-state equilibrium is maintained by a constant
growth path in a technologically leading country. Besides, even despite the fact
that country B prefers not to fund its research and development sector, it is still
possible to gain a sustainable growth through trade diffusion (trade with country
A). So, eventually both participating countries acquire the same growth pattern.
Lemma 2. Any steady-state equilibrium for the trade model described by the
dynamic problems for countries A and B, corresponds to a steady state of the
26
following three differential equations:
c˙A = cA
(
1
η + ν
(
2LAcA − (1− α)LAA
1
1−α
A α
2α
1−α
]
− ρ
)
, (39)
v˙ = Ωoe(v)Θoe(v, s), (22)
s˙ = g(s)− h(v, s), (40)
where
Ωoe(v) =
v(1− v)
1− v + (1− δ)v(φν − 1) , (41)
Θoe(v, s) =
(
ρ− g′(s) + θ s˙
s
)
(φν − 1)− θ(1− ν)h(v, s)
s
. (42)
Proposition 8. there exists unique steady-state equilibrium with c∗L > 0, 1/φ <
v∗ < 1 and 0 < s∗ < k. Furthermore, values v∗ and s∗ coincide with those
obtained for the closed economy. The steady-state equilibrium is a saddle point
with a one-dimensional stable manifold.
Proposition 9. When a unique steady-state equilibrium exists, the follower‘s
real exchange rate along this equilibrium, p∗B, increases with η and ν; and, it
decreases with k and g
Proposition 10. When a unique steady-state equilibrium exists, along this equi-
librium, c∗A, cAB
∗ and c∗B,(with ci = ci/N, i ∈ A,AB,B) increase with η and ν.
An increment in κ or g would increase cAB∗ and c∗B, while c
∗
A remains constant.
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Proposition 11. Along a steady-state equilibrium, the economies in both the
technological-leader and follower countries grow at the rate given by
γoe = (1 + α)
[
(1− α)α 2α1−α
2(η + ν)
LLA
1
1−α
L − ρ
]
. (43)
γoe decreases with η and ν. Furthermore, γoe is independent of κ and g.
It appears that if price of innovation, η, goes up, or price of adaptation, ν, in-
creases, then the benefits of innovation go down. As it wanes, so too does the
rate of returns on assets, r, for investors for technologically leading country. As
a consequence, powers influencing γoe turn negative. This comes out of the usual
definition of growth rates:
c˙A
cA
= r − ρ, (44)
c˙AB
cAB
= r − ρ− p˙B
pB
. (45)
Eventually, the resource abundance, depicted either via carrying capacity or the
intrinsic growth rate, does not influence the growth rate of open economies at all.
As we may evidence, resource blessing can actually bolster production in
country B. A better output-production needs increase of imports of each kind of
intermediate goods. Nonetheless, resource abundance diminishes real exchange
rates pB , which, as a consequence slows down the imports of intermediate goods
in country B. This damage compensates for the antecedent volatility to bolster
imports of intermediates to keep the value of consumption imports in A stable,
p∗Bc
∗
AB = c
∗
A. As resource blessing does not really affect the amount of interme-
diate goods traded, neither does it influence the rate of return in A or the growth
rate of both countries.
It is possible to see that both domestic innovation and technological dif-
fusion through trade with a country A allow sustainable economic growth in a
country that is endowed with a renewable natural resource that has a limited re-
generation rate and a bounded carrying capacity.
If we consider a situation according to which two trading countries use
a technology-diffusion-through-trade kind of collaboration, then we inevitably
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come to a fact that those entities in country A who produce actual innovations,
have to spend one unit of YA to manufacture an intermediate good that they have
invented by that time. Thus, prospective innovators of country B have to spend
the same amount of YA for the innovation they are executing, or, similarly, 1/p∗B
of products made in country B (YB). Consequently, if one wants to deliberate
what is the difference between technology diffusion through trade approach and
domestic innovation, it is needed to σ = 1/p∗B.
A proposition is needed to go further:
Proposition 12. The long-run growth rate under domestic innovation, γ, is
higher than that under trade with technologically advanced country, γoe , if and
only if ν/η > XA/XB(v∗, s∗).
Taking into account a return on asset rate in domestic innovation case and in
technology diffusion through trade case, it is possible to notice that that they are
equal only if XB(v∗, s∗)/η = [XA + XB(v∗, s∗)]/(η + ν). Consequently, this
is exactly a situation in which costs of innovating by home-based R&D sector
really equals to the cost, country B’s economy has to spend in order to facilitate
some imported technology from country A. If this holds, then r is also the same
in both cases. Besides, given the fact it is figured out by now in (9) and (27), that
r influences directly the consumption rate of country B’s population,it is possible
to claim that if conditions above hold, economies of A and B increment with the
same pace.
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3.5 Subtotals
It appears that, when it comes to an open economy, the shift from trade
with technologically leading country to domestic innovation bolsters the long-
run growth rate if the ratio ν/η) is not lower than 2σ/(1σ). Contrary, the long-
run growth rate diminishes if the output elasticity of the intermediate good is
sufficiently large, specifically, α > 2/3.
The bigger is the cost of facilitation of certain new technologies imported
from country A, the stronger becomes country B’s motivation to give preference
to domestic innovation rather than to choose a technology diffusion through trade
approach. This choice might also be the case, if there is too big quantity of each
intermediate good.
Abundance influences the economic growth rate and the consumption per
variety of intermediate goods differently under domestic innovation and with
trade with technologically advanced country.
Normally, economic processes in two countries can offer no real resistance
to model described above. The model that we use was forged as a typical growth
model by Francisco Cabo and others, and empowered to show that if country A
innovates, then it automatically transmits to the follower country. This is the way
the progress in one country guarantees progress in another one. The diffusion of
technology through trade becomes a real engine which is able to work on long-
term basis providing economic growth for both collaborating countries, whic is,
though, quite restricted by the resource bounty that the follower country has as
its disposal.
The aim of all the work done here is to study and develop the theoretical
and methodological aspects of the operation and the formation of an effective
system of growth and trade, as well as, the development of the concept of cre-
ating a favorable environment for the safe and smooth functioning of the both
economies which have decided to integrate with each other.
It is also worth of mentioning, that technology may infiltrate into country’s
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open economy differently. This includes FDI, labor spillovers, mimicry, licens-
ing.
In fact, the more the follower country practices in technology diffusion
through trade, the it becomes skilled in it. Some researchers call it a ”Learning-
to-learn effect” Connoly (2014). This ultimately means that the more country of
B type executes its technological imitation activities, the more experienced it be-
comes in it and the less time it needs to ”diffuse” newly obtained technology and
the less costly it is to facilitate it and use in production process. Consequently,
an inevitable conclusion arises: advantages of technological diffusion through
trade will sooner or later overweight those of domestic innovation. This is the
case, because constant import of advanced technologies from A-type country,
diminishes the price country B has to pay for its imitation activities. This will
ultimately lead to even faster economic growth for the follower country.
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4 The model of North-South trade model with en-
vironmental constraints
4.1 Introduction and factor description
As far as the history of humanity goes, different states were trying to reach
the outer world in order to get resources that are considered as scarce ones in their
own landings. With a passage of time, this process has intensified and created
some really unanticipated dilemmas, including ones related to the environmental
issues. Consequently, the race for sustainable economic growth should also take
into account a field of international relationships. The model makes a staggering
attempt to show that international economic exchanges can be executed in a way
that guarantees that all the participants benefit from it, and at the same time sup-
ports an improvement of economic realities of developing countries.
In this model, the North-South trade model is considered. The gist of the
model is focused on the conditions under which a balanced path may be achieved
through rational and optimal decisions made by the authorities of both Southern
and Northern regions.
In order to develop what was discussed before, it is worthwhile to consider
the same topic but from a bit different perspective. Francisco Cabo, Guiomar
Martin-Herran and Maria Pilar Martinez-Garcia gathered to make their article
North-South trade and the sustainability of economic growth: a model with en-
vironmental constraints. They came up with the model, which describes a trade,
which may happen between two distinct regions of the world (in this case, North
and South). In fact, in this model the Southern region is capable of producing
only a resource intensive good, which eventually finds its way to the North as
a traded good. On the North goods produced by the Southern region is used as
an input. The authors also assume that the Northern region has a developed re-
search and development sector, which can cause a positive effect on the traded
goods, or rise it‘s efficiency. In the end of the day, the model proves a possibility
of having a sustainable growth in the Northern region, which, in turn, may en-
hance a consumption on South, and, what is one of the most important points, it
can be achieved without exhausting a resource bounty, which exists on the South.
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The main idea of this model is to combine in one model two distinct re-
gions of the world that happen to trade with each other. The model starts by
defining the starting points. There is a Northern region, which is capable of
producing some unique final output. In order to produce this output, Northern
region needs to apply capital, labor and a resource-based input, which happens
to be outsourced from renewable natural resource base of another (Southern) re-
gion. Here the authors of the model pay some extra attention to the fact that
they assume a learning-by-doing effect, which basically means that in time, ex-
perience accumulated by labor force will influence productivity in a good way
(consequently, by investing in physical capital, a firm‘s workers learn how to do
their job more effectively).
The production can be described by the following function:
Y (t) = K(t)(h(t)RN(t))(K(t)v(t)L)
1−α−β, (46)
α, β, α + β ∈ (0, 1),
where K(t)stands for capital stock, RN(t) the resource based input, L the con-
stant labor and h(t) the technological knowledge or efficiency of RN(t) in the
production of Y (t). From the total labor, the portion v(t) ∈ (0, 1) is devoted to
final output production. The leftover, 1 − v(t) is given to the environmental re-
search and development sector. The authors, following Bovenberg and Smulder
(1995, 1996), assume that this sector which executes almost exclusively invest-
ment operations, increases the productivity of the resource-based input. In order
to introduce this relationship, authors provide following equation:
g˙(t) = η(1− v(t))g(t)L, η > 0. (47)
In order to proceed further we need to introduce the dynamics for the capi-
tal stock:
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K˙ = Y (K,hRN , KvL)− pRN − c, (31)
where Y (K,hRN , KvL) is the total production, c is a consumption, p is the
price of resource based input, pRN is the cost of resource-based input.
Northern region of this model maximizes its utility, which is discounted by
ρ > 0(ρ is the rate of time preference). There is a maximization problem that the
Northern region has to solve, which can be illustrated by following function:
max
c,RN ,v
∫ −ρt
0
ln(c)dt, (48)
s.t. K˙ = Kα(gRN)β(KvL)(1− α− β)− pRN − c,K(0) = K0,
g˙ = η(1− ν)gL, g(0) = g0,
c, RN ≥ 0, ν ∈ (0, 1). While it still makes sense for the Southern region, it con-
tinues to harvest its resources. As far as the production process on the South
goes, Southern workers make a resource-based input which, in turn, can be
traded to the Northern region, where it can be used for the production of the
final output. Back in 1990 Clark has described a dynamics of natural resource
stock‘s differential equation. Here it is incorporated it this way:
s˙ = rs(1− s/cc)− qEs, (49)
0 ≤ s ≤ cc,
where r is the intrinsic growth rate, cc is the environmental carrying capac-
ity or saturation level, q is a proportionality parameter and E is the extraction
effort allocated to the natural resource. Now it’s time to pay our attention to the
production of the resource-based input (which happens to depend on the stock
and the extraction effort of the natural resource):
RS = Φ(E, s) = Es
θ, (50)
where θ is for the elasticity of the resource-based input, θ ∈ (0, 1) and ΦE,Φs >
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0.
Apparently, it is getting obvious that the bigger stock of the natural resources is,
the better labor executes its operations (since they gain more experience through
the work which leads to a more polished products they produce) and a produc-
tivity of the total effort goes up, which in turn causes a greater production of a
resource based input.
Southern region, which trades with the Northern one at some point, has to de-
liberate what level of harvesting effort E to choose. Southern region wants to
maximize its stream utility at rate ρ′ > 0.
More than that, authors also note that there‘re no investment operations ex-
ecuted in the Southern region, and as a consequence, entire income is normally
consumed and the utility equals the logarithmic transformation of this consump-
tion, ln(pRS). There is a unique maximization problem that Southern region has
to solve:
max
E
∫ infty
0
e−ρ
′tln(pEsθ)dt, (51)
s.t.s˙ = rs(1− s
cc
− qEs, s(0) = s0
E ≥ 0, θ ∈ (0, 1).
Just as it happens in the Northern region, the intertemporal elasticity of the
Southern region‘s utility is constant too and equals to one. If we take a particular
North-South trade model, then we should consider a situation when each and
every region tries to maximize its utility. At the same time, another condition
is that both these regions take prices, which were created by the world stock
market, as those which are given. However, these condition have some conse-
quent ideas which may come out them: first of all, it appears that both of our
Southern and Northern regions are not really informed regarding the outcome to
which that their strategic decision on the price of goods (which they trade with
each other) may lead. More than that, it is also evident that most likely, either of
considered regions represents just small but open economies. As a consequence,
it means that both of them are price-takers (in this particular formation we con-
sider a Northern region to be a developed one, and a Southern region is seen as
a developing one.
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4.2 Optimal paths
Now it is very important to deliberate which paths for both of our regions
can be considered as optimal ones. More than that, we are challenged to figure
out which price level for the goods, North and South trade with each other can
be seen as an equilibrium price. Apparently, this price is going to come out of
South’s supply and North’s demand.
The current-value Hamiltonian for the North is given by,
HN = ln(c) +mK
[
K1−β(gRN)β(vL
1−α−β − pRN − c) +mh[η(1− v)gL]
]
,
(52)
where mK and mh stand for the shadow prices of the capital stock and the tech-
nological knowledge respectively.
At this point we can write down the first order conditions for an interior
maximum:
1
c
= mK , (53)
p = βgK1−β(gRN)β−1(vL)1−α−β, (54)
mgηg = mK(1− α− β)K1−β(gRN)β−1(vL)−α−β, (55)
m˙K = mK
[
ρ− (1− β)
(
gRN
K
)β
(vL)1−α−β
]
, (56)
m˙g = mg
[
ρ− ηβ
(1− α− β)vL − η(1− ν)L
]
. (57)
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The first equation says that the marginal utility of consumption should equal the
shadow price of the capital stock. The second equation stands for the marginal
productivity of the resource-based input which equals its price. The condition
that we get in the third equation tells us that the ratio between the marginal ben-
efit of an additional unit of capital, and the marginal benefit of an additional unit
of technological knowledge, is equal to the marginal effect on the technological
growth of an extra unit of labor in this sector divided by the marginal effect on the
capital growth of an additional unit of labor in the final output sector. The fourth
equation stands for the condition that shows that the marginal productivity of the
capital stock plus the rate of change of the marginal benefit of an additional unit
of capital should equal the depreciation rate. At last, the final equation says that
the depreciation rate equals the value of marginal productivity of the technology
plus this factor‘s rate of growth plus the rate of change of the marginal benefit of
an additional unit of technology.
Consequently, the optimal demand for the resource-based input and the op-
timal labor share in the final output sector can be written this way:
RN = β
1
α
[
(
1− α− β)
ηβ
] (1−α−β)
α
[
mK
mg
] 1−α−β
α
[
K
g
] 1− [
p
g
]−1− β
α
, (58)
vL = β
1
α
[
(
1− α− β)
ηβ
] (1−β)
α
[
mK
mg
] 1−β
α
[
K
g
] 1− [
p
g
]−1− β
α
, (59)
In Southern case the current-value Hamiltonian function is:
HS = ln(pEs
θ) +mS
[
rs
(
1− s
cc
)
− qEs
]
. (60)
The first order conditions for an interior maximum in this region are:
E =
1
qmss
, (61)
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m˙s =
[
ρ′ − r
(
1− 2s
cc
)
+ qE
]
ms − θ
s
. (62)
It appears that the optimal harvesting effort and the current resource bounty that
South enjoys are bonded in a way, which can be called as a negative one. Con-
sequently, it can only mean that if Southern region happens to appreciate his
resource bounty, then with the rise of this value (of appreciation), his extraction
effort is going to vain.
Now, based on what we have seen before, it is possible to say that the opti-
mal supply of the resource-based input is:
RN =
1
qmss1 − θ . (63)
The supply that this equation stands for actually dictates how many of Southern
goods are traded from South to North. This, however, also means that exactly
this amount of resource-based Southern goods are going to be used by North in
its production cycle. In fact, pRs equals total income the South can get.
Now, to sum up everything that we have seen, we should equate South‘s
supply and North‘s demand. This may help us to finally find the equilibrium
price for the resource-based input:
p = ψ[qmss
1−θ]
α
α+β
[
mK
mg
] 1−α−β
α+β
[
K
g
] 1−β
α+β
g, (64)
where constant Ψ ≡ β
[
1−α−β
η
] 1−α−β
α+β
> 0.
Here we should pay extra attention to the fact that the more were appreci-
ate the value of the capital stock, the less we spend our labor resources on the
environmental research and development sector, which, in turn, leads to lower
increase in the resource based input productivity. Consequently, as the demand
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for such kind of input rises, so too does its price.
4.3 The balanced path
At this point, it is plausible to discuss such a pattern which allows each and
every variable of our function to grow at some constant rate.
First order for the South’s maximization problem:
m˙s
ms
= ρ′ − ∂s˙
∂s
− θ
sms
. (65)
Consequently, the growth rate of R can be written this way:
R˙
R
= −m˙s
ms
− s˙
s
= −ρ′+θqE+ ∂s˙
∂s
− (1− θ)s˙
s
= −ρ′+θF (s)/s+ ∂s˙
∂s
− s˙
s
, (66)
where F (s) stands for logistic growth function. The natural growth rate per
unit of resource, F (s)/s, is greater than the marginal growth rate F‘(s) at any
point. Consequently, s˙
s
− ∂s˙
∂s
is positive, and from a necessary condition for a
non-zero constant resource-based input is θF (s)/s > ρ′ In fact, this means that
the output elasticity with respect to the stock of the natural resource in the pro-
duction cycle of the Southern region, ε(sRs) = θ, times the natural growth rate
per unit of resource, exceeds the rate of time preference. It appears that there
should be a condition, which is necessary for this inequality:
θr − ρ′ > 0. (67)
The resource-based input can be shown as a function of the resource stock:
R˙
R
= θr − ρ′ − (1 + θ)rs/cc. (68)
We can come to conclusion that the resource-based input remains unchanged
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when the natural resource stock takes the constant value:
s∗ =
(θr − ρ′)cc
[(1 + θ)r]
. (69)
By working with the North’s FOCs and the growth rate of consumption:
c˙
c
= (1− β)
(
gR
K
)β
(vL)1−α−β − ρ. (70)
It appears that v and R continue to be constant following a constant path. Con-
sequently, the growth rate of consumption is going to follow the same pattern.
However, it is only possible if g and K grow at the same rate.
We can also say that:
(1− α− β) (Rg
K
)β
(vL)−α−β
η
=
(
mg
mK
)( g
K
)
. (71)
Because of this, the shadow prices of the physical capital and the technological
knowledge also grow at the same rate, as they follow a balanced path. Consider-
ing the fact that R, mg
mK
, K
h
, are constant on the balanced trajectory we notice that
so too does p
h
.
At the same time:
K˙
K
=
(
Rg
K
)
(vL)1−α−β − pR
K
− c
K
, (72)
which means that the capital growth rate will be constant if capital stock and
consumption grow as well.
Now let’s write down dynamic equations for the following variables: c, v, p, R, s(where
c = c/K; and p = p/K). Here we also should take into account that a balanced
path in the original variables corresponds to variables above.
c˙ = c[c− ρ],
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v˙ =
v
[
β
(
θr − ρ′ − (1+)rs
cc
)
+ βη + (β − 1)pR + (β − 1)c
]
α + β
+
βην2
1− α− β ,
(73)
p˙ =
p
α + β
[
−α
[
θr − ρ′ − (1+θ)rs
cc
]
+ βη + (β − 1)pR− (1− α− 2β)c
] ,
(74)
R˙ =
[
θr − ρ′ − (1 + θ)rs
cc
]
, (75)
s˙ = rs
(
1− s
cc
)
− qRs1−θ. (76)
It becomes evident that the equilibria for these equations are bonded to sustained
growth paths.
It is also getting possible to show that there is a unique balanced path with a
constant and positive stock of the natural resource if it satisfies θr − ρ′ > 0. On
the balanced path:
m˙∗K
m˙∗K
+
K˙∗
K∗
=
m˙∗g
m˙∗g
+
g˙∗
g∗
= ρ−
(
ηβ
1− α− β
)
ν∗ < ρ, (77)
and therefore, transversatility conditions, given by are satisfied:
limt→+∞ e−ρtm∗K(t)K∗(t) = 0,
limt→+∞ e−ρtm∗g(t)h∗(t) = 0.
At the same time, as ms and s stay constant on the balanced path, this
transversatility condition is satisfied too: limt→+∞ e−ρ′tm∗s(t)s∗(t) = 0.
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4.4 Subtotals
So, this was a model which illustrated a bilateral trade between two differ-
ent regions belonging to different parts of the world. In this particular set, North-
ern region‘s production cycle depends on labor, capital and some input which is
imported from the Southern region. At the same time this Southern region‘s
production is based around resource harvesting. The model presented by Fran-
cisco Cabo, Guiomar Martin-Herran and Maria Pilar Martinez-Garcia proves a
very existence of a balanced path, which allows both Northern and Southern
regions to achieve a steady growth, without exhausting a resource bounty that
South is endowed with. Following a balanced path, introduced by the authors of
the model, the accumulation of physical capital and technological skills in the
Northern region leads to a stable growth of consumption and production.
However, at certain point, the Northern region which is considered to be a
wealthier one, starts paying a price which is gradually getting higher and higher
for the intermediate resource-based input. Consequently, it is possible to say
that international trade is the instrument, which allows transmitting Northern
economic rise to the Southern region. Benefits for the South which it gets from
the trade are constantly rising, so too does its consumption.
It is an often matter when a rapid economic growth comes at price of envi-
ronmental devastation. Perhaps the most remarkable example is China, which
had to pay for its industrialization and rapid tempo of its economic growth
by horrific environmental consequences (Chinese rivers are among the polluted
worldwide and soil is considered to be damaged by chemical wastes severely)
and populations health problems. Even though China is a very special case and
has to be approached individually, Chinese government recognizes the necessity
to improve and environmental policies and make them much stricter.
However, it usually happens as a consequence of mismanagement of nat-
ural resource stock, as in fact benefits received from resources should be able
to compensate natures damage. In recent decades, in countries with developing
economies, there is a trend of active reform of economies with more attention
to environment. This is due to the understanding and recognition of the key role
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played by environment and resources in everyday life of citizens and economy as
a whole. Adjusting trade and economic policies to this reality is directly linked
to the development of new technologies, strengthening the importance of the is-
sue of efficiency and security of national resource stock.
It is worth noting that in the advanced economies, the process of identifying
such an important issues was executed quite a long time ago, while in the major-
ity of countries with transitional, this process is very far from being referred to
as a complete one.
Nowadays, when world has changed greatly, globalization took over all as-
pects of our life, it influences much bigger group of people than it was in the
previous century. Now, when information is transmitted instantly and mobil-
ity of people has increased, a technological progress steps forth to the center
of economic stage serving as a saviour to worlds environment and an engine of
economic development. Technology should be used to increase an efficiency of
resource usage, which will help to save them and produce the same amount of
goods with lesser input needed.
Ultimately, technology will increase an efficiency of resource usage which
will lead to a brighter future for future inhabitants of the Earth.
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5 Conclusion
This thesis has been discussing a thought-provoking and up-to-date topic
of growth from the perspective of countries endowed with natural resources and
with resource-dependent economies. Some emerging markets worldwide strug-
gle in their attempt of catching up with sustainability, wealth and advanced R&
D sector of developed countries. The research made in this work proves an ex-
istence of sustainable growth path based on collaboration between a technolog-
ical leader which needs resources or some resource-based input imported from
abroad on one hand, and a technological follower who is endowed with a rich
stock of natural resource.
Steady and firm economic growth has been in a spotlight of a lot of sci-
entist in recent twenty years. However, the most up to date trend is including
environmental factors, bringing up more ecological growth to the table, so that
it eould be possible to keep up with present lifestyle (wealth level), but without
devastating our natural resources that out generation inherited.
That is why such a great attention in this work is beeing kept on such factors as
technological knowledge and efficiency, which should increase labor productiv-
ity and elevate it to a different level. This, in turn reduces consumption of natural
resources and at the same time improves quality of final goods.
Models have been analyzed and calculated for two types of countries: one
of them is a resource-rich economy and highly depends on its resource extrac-
tion sector; at the same time other country lacks resources but is technologically
much more advanced and uses resource-based goods imported from the other
country as an input for its production sector. First and foremost aim of this work
is to deliberate the way, thanks to which, those two countries can gain sustain-
ability of the economic growth. Besides, another concern of this work is an
attempt to consider an environmental factor of economic development in both
economies.
Deliberations here are accompanied by two models of technological diffu-
sion through trade and trade with environmental constraints. Calculating these
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scenarios through, I came to conditions under which there is a distinct possibil-
ity of gaining a unique steady-state equilibrium. These two models persuasively
show that there is a way which allows two countries grow together but not ex-
haust their resource bounty at the same time. If two countries follow these con-
ditions intently and firmly, then their consumption, output and natural resource
price grow, while the resource stock hover around the same rate as it used to be.
In the second chapter, a technologically backward country in considered
which is blessed with a sufficient resource bounty and, at the same time, is able
to acquire technologies it needs from a foreign market. A counterpart of this
country (technological leader) develops its own know-hows and sophisticated
technologies which, in turn, may be sold to the technological follower. So, this
is the case in which technological follower (or just a developing country which is
used to make its profits almost exclusively from resource extraction) reaches its
sustainable growth aim without any huge development (or investment) of its R&
D sector. This is especially important considering that in many developing coun-
tries R& D sector is significantly underdeveloped or doesn’t exist at all. This
is the way thanks to which sustainable economic development and solid pace of
growth is transmitted from the technological leader to the technological follower.
Results obtained here makes us question views of those who support a
resource-curse theory. Some research works propose point of view according
to which a resource richness of some country is inversely proportional to its
long run economic growth (for example, Eliasson and Turnovsky 2004). This is
caused by the fact that models considering a negative relationship between long
run growth and resource wealth, use profits made by resource trade only for a
purchase of consumption (final) goods. However, in this work technological dif-
fusion through trade not only allows to grow economically but also increases an
efficiency of natural resource-usage (it is considered that technological follower
doesnt export just raw resources and materials but exports some intermediate
good, which technological leader is uses as an input in its production). This will
lead to a situation which will not force technological follower’s economy in a
state which is called as a resource curse.
45
However, it is worth of mentioning that models calculated here are used
only if two small open economies are considered. None of them is big enough to
gain some power to influence market as well as there are no other options than
collaborating with each other instead of collaborating with someone else instead
(so, loosely speaking, these two economies cannot find any substitutes for each
other). As resource richness of the technologically backward country is bigger,
consumption per variety of intermediate good goes up. At the same time, has no
influence over consumption in the developed country.
The adaptation and innovation costs are also taken into consideration in this
work. This is done on order to deliberate what is more convenient for a develop-
ing country: develop its domestic intrinsic innovation field, or use a technology
diffusion through trade approach. The conclusion is non questionable: domes-
tic innovation requires a bigger rate of consumption per variety of intermediate
goods, compared to those in technological diffusion through trade case.
An inevitable conclusion arises: the bigger an economy of technological
follower is the more it is able to switch from developing its own independent R&
D sector to a technology diffusion through trade approach and vice versa. It is
also possible to say that the wealth benefits more in large country if it has a do-
mestic innovation sector. This ultimately means that in a big country a resource
bounty is definitely a blessing rather than a curse. Resource richness supports
investments in R& D sector in a big open economy.
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Appendix
Conducting equations (53), (54), (55), (56), (57)
The North maximizes it’s intertemporal utility, discounted at the rate of
time preference bigger than 0. It chooses consumption, demand for the resource-
based input and the labour share devoted to the final output sector. The maxi-
mization problem is subject to the dynamics of the capital stock and the techno-
logical knowledge
max
c,RN ,v
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtln(c)dt
s.t. K˙ = Kα(hRN)
β(KvL)1−α−β − pRN − c, K(0) = K0,
h˙ = η(1− v)hL, h(0) = h0
c, RN ≥ 0, v ∈ (0, 1),
The Hamiltonian corresponding to this maximization is:
HN = ln(c) +mK [K
1−β(hRN)β(vL
1−α−β − pRN − c)] +mh[η(1− v)hL],
where mK and mh denote the shadow prices of the capital stock and the
technological knowledge, respectively.
The first order conditions for an interior maximum are obtained this way:
∂HN
∂c
= 1/c−mK = 0,
∂HN
∂RN
= βhK1−β(hRN)β−1(vL)1−α−β − p = 0,
∂HN
∂v
= mK(1− α− β)K1−β(hRN)β(vL)−α−β −mhηh = 0,
Where mK evolves according to:
m˙K = ρmK − ∂HN∂K = mK [ρ− (1− β)(hRN/K)β(vL)1−α−β],
lim
t→∞
mkke
−ρtdt = 0.
At the same time mh evolves according to:
m˙h = ρmK − ∂HN∂L = mh[ρ− ηβ/(1− α− β)vL− η(1− v)L],
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Consequently, the first order conditions for an interior maximum are:
1/c = mK ,
p = βhK1−β(hRN)β−1(vL)1−α−β,
mhηh = mK(1− α− β)K1−β(hRN)β(vL)−α−β,
m˙K = mK [ρ− (1− β)(hRN/K)β(vL)1−α−β],
m˙h = mh[ρ− ηβ/(1− α− β)vL− η(1− v)L],
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Conducting equations (61), (62)
As we may evidence here,the South has to come up with a very important
decision: what a harvesting effort, E, should be. What makes this region differ-
ent from the other one, is also that it maximizes its stream of utility discounted
at rate ρ ¿0. We assume that no investment comes to this region; as well as the
entire income is consumed here right away and the utility is equal to the loga-
rithmic transformation of this consumption, ln(pRS).
So, the maximization problem for the South can be expressed this way:
maxE
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtln(pEsθ)dt
s.t.s˙ = rs(1− s/cc)− qEs, s(0) = s0,
E ≥ 0, θ ∈ (0, 1).
The Hamiltonian corresponding to this maximization is:
HS = ln(pEs
θ) +ms[rs(1− s/cc)− qEs],
where ms is the Souths shadow price of the natural resource stock.
The first order conditions for an interior maximum in this region are obtained
this way:
∂H
∂E
= 1/(qmss)− E = 0.
Where ms evolves according to:
m˙s = ρms − ∂H∂s = ms[ρ− r(1− 2s/cc) + qE]ms − θ/s.
lim
t→∞
msse
−ρtdt = 0.
Consequently, the first order conditions for an interior maximum are:
E = 1/(qmss),
m˙s = [ρ− r(1− 2s/cc) + qE]ms − θ/s,
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Conducting equation (77)
Let’s recall what we found out when we were conducting the first order
conditions for an interior maximum of Norths demand. It was figured out that the
ratio between the marginal benefit of an additional unit of capital, mK , and the
marginal benefit of an additional unit of technological knowledge, mh, is equal
to the marginal effect on the technological growth of an extra unit of labour in
this sector divided by the marginal effect on the capital growth of an additional
unit of labor in the final output sector. This, essentially meant that:
mhηh = mK(1− α− β)K1−β(hRN)β(vL)−α−β,
This fact brings us to the following equation:
(1− α− β)(Rh/K)β(vL)−α−β/η = (mh
mK
)(
h
K
) =
mhh
mKK
Taking into account that R,mK/mh, p/h and K/h do not change along the
balanced path, it is possible to conduct following:
mhh = mKK
logmh + log h = logmK + logK
m˙h
mh
+
h˙
h
=
m˙K
mK
+
K˙
K
On a balanced path it looks like this:
m˙∗K
m∗K
+
K˙∗
K∗
=
m˙∗h
m∗h
+
h˙∗
h∗
m˙∗K
m∗K
+ K˙
∗
K∗ =
m˙∗h
m∗h
+ h˙
∗
h∗ = η(1−v)hL+mh[ρ−ηβ/(1−α−β)vL−η(1−v)L] =
mhρ− mhηβ(1−α−β)vL −mhη(1− v)L+ η(1− v)hL =
ρ− ηβ
1− α− β v
∗ < ρ
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Conducting equation (33)
A typical consumer has to determine consumption, c, and the fraction of la-
bor , v and 1−v, used in the final-output production or in harvesting, to maximize
discounted utility:
max
c,v
∫ ∞
0
ln(c)e−ρtdt, ρ > 0
s.t. s˙ = g(s)− h = gs(1− s/k)− h, s(0) = s0,
a˙ = ra+ vw + phh− c, a(0) = a0.
∂W
∂t
= W˙ = rW + (1− τ)Y − pC
The Hamiltonian corresponding to this maximization is:
H = logC + λW˙ = logC + λ[rW + (1− τ)Y − pC].
Where λ evolves according to:
λ˙ = ρλ− ∂H
∂W
= (ρ− r)λ,
lim
t→∞
λWe−ρtdt = 0.
The maximization of Hamiltonian yields:
∂H
∂C
=
1
C
− λρ = 0
Total consumption expenditure evolves according to:
E˙
E
=
c˙
c
= r − ρ.
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Conducting equation (28), (29), (30)
Now we solve the profit-maximization problem of firms in the final output
sector in the technological follower country, and consequently it is possible to
acquire the net marginal products are equated to factor prices:
Let‘s maximize the profit function:
pi = YF − wFLF − phhLF −
N∑
j=1
XFjpj
The final output production function can be presented this way:
YF = AF (vLF )
1−α−β
N∑
j=1
XαFj(hLF )
β

∂YF
∂vLF
= (1− α− β) YF
vLF
− wF = 0
∂YF
∂hLF
= β YF
hLF
− ph = 0
∂YF
∂XFj
= αAF (vLF )
1−α−βXα−1Fj (hLF )
β − pj = 0
Consequently, the net marginal products equated to factor prices are:
wF = (1− α− β) YF
vLF
,
ph = β
YF
hLF
,
XFj = vLF (
αAF
pFj
)
1
1−α (
h
v
)
β
1−α .
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Proof of proposition 7
If a steady-state equilibrium exists (under either the SOE or LOE scenar-
ios), along this path,
• v, s, h, pF and r remain constant;
• YL, YF , cL, cLF , cF , ph, wL, and wF grow at the same rate as N .
Variables v and s cannot grow indefinitely at a non-zero constant rate because
they are lower and upper bounded (v ∈ [0, 1] and s ∈ [0, ]). These variables must
be constant on a steady-state equilibrium. Provided that h depends on v and s,
which are motionless, the harvesting also must remain constant on a steady-state
equilibrium.
The growth rate of the number of intermediate goods, N, replacing the expression
cL = pF cLF
of the consumption of imported goods in the technologically leading country
given in
N˙ =
1
η + ν
[YL − (cL + pF cLF )LL −N(XL − 1− α
α
XF )],
can be written as:
N˙
N
=
1
η + ν
[ALL
1−α
L X
α
L − 2
cL
N
LL −XL + 1− α
α
XF (v, s)].
The growth rate of N is constant along the steady-state equilibrium if the con-
sumption of the national good in the leader country, cL, grows at the same rate
as the number of intermediate goods, N , and at the same time, the amount of
intermediate goods used in the follower final-output sector, XF (v, s), is also sta-
tionary.
From equation
XFj = XF = LF (pFAF )
1
1−αα
2
1−αv
1−α−β
1−α h
β
1−α ,
for XF to be constant, since v and h are motionless, the terms of trade, pF , must
also remain constant. Taking into account
r =
1
η + ν
1− α
α
(XL +XF ),
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provided that pF , v and h remain constant along the steady-state equilibrium,
the interest rate r is also constant and equal to:
r =
α
2
1−α (1− α)[LLA 11−α + LFv
1−α−β
1−β (pFAF )
1
1−αh
β
1−α ]
(η + ν)α
As we know, the per-capita budget constraint for a representative consumer is:
vwF + phh = cF ,
This and (26) lead us to the following:
˙cF/cF = Y˙F/YF .
Considering (21), (31) and (2), it appears thatthe growth rate of consumption and
final-output production of the follower country is:
˙cF
cF
=
Y˙F
YF
=
α
1− α
p˙F
pF
+
(1− α− β)(1− φv)
(1− α)(1− v)
v˙
v
+
N˙
N
+
βθ
1− α
s˙
s
In the situation of the steady-state equilibrium, such constants as v, s, pF make
it possible to transform YF and cF into equation above, as if it is the same as the
N . Besides, from cL = pF cLF , as pF does not change in the steady-state equi-
librium, then cLF is equal to the growth rate of the national good consumption
in the leading country.
Considering the fact that α2YL = NXL, the growth rate of the production in the
leading country is the same as that of N , as XL is constant.
At last, as we are aware of the fact that h is constant all the way through, (26)
exhibits that the price of the natural resource grows at the same rate as YF in the
steady-state equilibrium.
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Proof of Lemma 1
Any steady-state equilibrium for the model previously described corresponds
to a steady state of the following three differential equations:
c˙ = c
{
L
η
[
c
σ
−
(
1− α
α
)
α
1+α
1−α
(
A
σ
) 1
1−α
v
1−α−β
1−α h
β
1−α
]
− ρ
}
,
v˙ = Ω(v)
{
Θ(v, s) + (φv − 1) c˙
c
}
,
s˙ = g(s)− h(v, s),
where
Ω(v) =
(1− α)v(1− v)
(1− α)(1− v) + (1− α− β)(1− δv)(φv − 1) ,
Θ(v, s) =
[
ρ− g
(
1− 2s
κ
)
+ θ
1− α− β
1− α
s˙
s
]
(φv − 1)− θ(1− v)h
s
.
In order to do prove it, let’s solve the maximization problem: a typical
consumer of the country has to make a major decision on how big should his /
her consumption be and how much of labor to invest into final-output production.
This is made in order to maximize discounted utility:
max
c,v
∫ ∞
0
ln(c)eρtdt, rho > 0.
s.t. s˙ = g(s)− h = gs (1− s
k
)− h,
a˙ = ra+ vw + phh− c, a(0) = a0.
If we run this maximization problem, the necessary conditions for an interior
solution will unleash:
1
c
= µ,
(1− δ)(−λ+ µph) h
1− v = µw,
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µ˙ = µ[ρ− r],
λ˙+ λ
[
g
(
1− 2 s
κ
)
− θh
s
− ρ
]
= −µphθh
s
,
This works together with the transversatility conditions:
limt→∞ µ(t)a(t)e−ρt = 0,
limt→∞ λ(t)s(t)e−ρt = 0 where µ - shadow price of assets; λ - shadow price of
renewable resource.
Here, it is reasonable to notice that if labor and resource stock are kept at
the same level, then harvesting and asset-return rate are stable as well. Besides,
increment of final-output production is going keep the same pace as the number
of intermediate goods. However, this is possible only if c is constant too.
Let’s now derive the dynamics for c.
c˙
c
=
c˙
c
− N˙
N
= r − ρ− N˙
N
=
1
η
1− α
α
(
A
σ
) 1
1−α
α
2
2−αLv
1−α−β
1−α h
β
1−α − ρ− N˙
N
=
1
η
1− α
α
(
A
σ
) 1
1−α
α
2
2−αLv
1−α−β
1−α h
β
1−α − ρ− 1
η
[(
1
α2
)
X − c
N
L
σ
]
= c
{
L
η
[
c
σ
−
(
1− α
α
)
α
1+α
1−α
(
A
σ
) 1
1−α
v
1−α−β
1−α h
β
1−α
]
− ρ
}
.
In order to describe the dynamics of labor (v), let’s continue manipulations
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with interior maximum conditions:
(1− δ)(−λ+ µph) h
1− v = µw
(1− δ)(−λ+ µβ Y
hL
)
h
1− v = µ(1− α− β)
Y
vL
λh(v, s) =
(φv − 1)(1− α− β)Y
(1− δ)vcL
After differentiation:
λ˙
λ
+
h˙
h
=
1
φv − 1v
v˙
v
+
Y˙
Y
− c˙
c
.
Considering (2), we obtain:
h˙
h
= −(1− δ) v˙
(1− v) + θ
s˙
s
.
Y˙
Y
− c˙
c
= −(1− α− β)(φv − 1)
(1− α)(1− v)
v˙
v
+
θβ
(1− α
s˙
s
− c˙
c
.
λ˙
λ
+
h˙
h
=
1
φv − 1v
v˙
v
+
Y˙
Y
− c˙
c
λ˙
λ
+−(1−δ) v˙
(1− v)+θ
s˙
s
=
1
φv − 1v
v˙
v
+−(1− α− β)(φv − 1)
(1− α)(1− v)
v˙
v
+
θβ
(1− α)
s˙
s
− c˙
c
v˙ = (1−α)v(1−v)
(1−α)(1−v)+(1−α−β)(1−δv)(φv−1) ×
×
{[
ρ− g (1− 2s
κ
)
+ θ 1−α−β
1−α
s˙
s
]
(φv − 1)− θ(1− v)h
s
+ (φv − 1) c˙
c
}
v˙ = Ω(v)
{
Θ(v, s) + (φv − 1) c˙
c
}
Dynamics of s is taken from (1).
s˙ = g(s)− h = gs
(
1− s
k
)
− h)
s˙ = g(s)− h(v, s).
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Proof of Lemma 2
Any steady-state equilibrium for the trade model described by the dynamic
problems for countries A and B, corresponds to a steady state of the following
three differential equations:
c˙L = c¯L
(
1
η + ν
[2LLc¯L − (1− α)LLA
1
1−α
L α
2α
1−α ]− ρ
)
,
v˙ = f oe1 (v, s) = Ω
oe(v)Θoe(v, s),
s˙ = f2(v, s) = g(s)− h(v, s).
In order to do prove it, let’s solve the maximization problem: the only asset
that country’s consumer may have is the ownership of the natural resource. Con-
sequently a consumer has to decide on cF and v employed in harvesting of re-
sources in order to maximize utility:
max
∫ ∞
0
ln(cF )e
−ρtdt,
s.t. vwF + phh = cF
s˙ = g(s)− h = gs(1− s/k)− h, s(0) = s0,
If we run this maximization problem, the necessary conditions for an inte-
rior solution will unleash:
wF + ph
∂h
∂v
= λF
∂h
∂v
(phh+ vwf ),
λ˙F −
[
ph
∂h
∂s
phh+ vwF
+ λF
(
g′(s)− ∂h
∂s
)]
,
lim
t→∞
λF se
−ρtdt = 0
where λF stands for the shadow price associated with the stock of the natural
resource, s. Considering the definition of the harvesting h(v, s) = b(1− v)1−δsθ
, we take a partial derivatives of h with respect to v and to s. Let’s now substitute
these in the equations above:
β − 1− v
1− δ
1− α− β
v
=
1− α
2
λFh,
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λ˙F =
(
ρ− g′(s) + θh
s
)
λF − βθ
s(1− α) .
It appears that the dynamics of the new variable, cF , is c˙/c = c˙/c − N˙/N =
r − ρ− N˙/N , which by substituting the interest rate by its expression
r =
1
η + ν
1− α
α
(XL +XF )
and employing
N˙
N
=
1
η + ν
[ALL
1−α
L X
α
L − 2
cL
N
LL −XL + 1− α
α
XF (v, s)],
can eventually become this:
c˙L = c¯L
(
1
η + ν
[2LLc¯L − (1− α)LLA
1
1−α
L α
2α
1−α ]− ρ
)
In order to derive the dynamics for v we should substitute ph and w in 26
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Proof of proposition 8
The steady-state equilibrium is a saddle point with a one-dimensional stable
manifold. In 2003 Martinez-Garcia showed us that when transversatility condi-
tions are satisfied, the steady state of an endogenous growth is not absolutely
stable.In order to prove a saddle-point property, a negative sign for the determi-
nant of the Jacoban matrix of the dynamical system (lemma above) evaluated at
the steady state is needed.
(Joe)∗ = Joe(c∗L, v∗, s∗) =

woe11 0 0
0 woe22 w
oe
23
0 w32 w33
 ,
where woe11 = 2c
∗
L/(η + ν) > 0,
woe22 = Ω(v
∗)φ[ρ− g(1− 2s∗/κ)] + θ(2− δ)h∗/s∗ + θ[φv∗ − 1][∂(s˙/s)/∂v],
woe23 = Ω(v
∗)[φv∗ − 1]2g/κ+ θ(1− θ)(1− v∗)h∗/s∗2 + θ[φv∗ − 1][∂(s˙/s)/∂s].
It appears that one of the three eigenvalues of matrix above is given by
woe11 > 0.Consequently, for θ = 0 or θ = 1 the determinant for this Jacobian
matrix will be negative. This fact means that the Jacoban matrix presents two
positive eigenvalues and one negative eigenvalue, and as a consequence, the
saddle-point stability is proved.
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Proof of proposition 9
When a unique steady-state equilibrium exists, the follower’s real exchange
rate along this equilibrium, p∗B, increases η and ν; and it decreases with κ and g.
Let’s take into account equation (///) LLpF cLF = pjNXF . At the same time
we should consider the optimal consumption decisions in the technologically
advanced country cL = pF cLF . This ultimately leads us to the following:
LLc
∗
L = pjXF (v
∗, s∗).
This should be merged with XFj = XF = LF (pFAF )
1
1−αα
2
1−αv
1−α−β
1−α h
β
1−α .
Now, as final preparation, let’s use this
c˙L = c¯L
(
1
η + ν
[2LLc¯L − (1− α)LLA
1
1−α
L α
2α
1−α ]− ρ
)
,
and using interior solutions, in a steady state equilibrium:
c∗L =
ρ(η + ν) + LLA
1
1−α
L α
2α
1−α (1− α)
2LL
Altogether it gives us:
c∗L =
[
ρ(η + ν) + LLA
1
1−α
L α
2α
1−α (1− α)
]1−α
21−αα1 + αAFL1−αF (v∗)1−α−βh∗β
.
Consequently, the positive influence of η and ν on p∗F instantly follows. The
effects of parameters κ and g on p∗F are qualitatively the same as the effects
of these parameters on γsoe. Besides, resource bounty has no influence on the
numerator in this expression. The terms of trade at the steady state decrease
together with κ and g.
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